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THE LOST JUSTIFICATION: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE 
ARGUMENT FOR EXPANDING BRADY RIGHTS 
Chris Dernbach* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
White-collar crime became a high priority for federal prosecutors 
beginning in the mid-1970s.1  Watergate, corporate wrongdoing, and 
the rise of investigative journalism all contributed to the growing 
interest in white-collar crime.2  What was once avoided by the criminal 
justice system and placed into regulatory and administrative agencies 
has become a top investigative priority for the U.S. Department of 
Justice.3  The post-Watergate public attitude and public disclosures of 
governmental and corporate misconduct created a ripe climate for the 
“discovery” of white-collar crime.4  FBI Director William Webster 
remarked in 1980 that white-collar crime must be a number one 
priority “because it strikes at the very fiber of our society by 
undermining trust and confidence in our political, governmental, and 
financial systems.”5  Closer to the present, attitudes following the global 
financial crisis and recession, coupled with the notion that law-
enforcement disproportionately targets people of color and those of 
lower socioeconomic status, create political incentives for the 
Department of Justice to emphasize white-collar prosecutions.6  Despite 
this rise, most observers agree that white-collar criminal justice “is in 
 
*J.D. candidate Seton Hall University School of Law, B.A. Ramapo College of New Jersey.  
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 1 Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar 
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 408 
(1993).  
 2 Id. 
 3 TONY. G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 132–33 (1994).  
 4 Id. at 133.  
 5 Id.  
 6 Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, Sting Victims: Third-Party Harms in Undercover 
Police Operations, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1339 (2015).  
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need of substantial reform,” both to ensure fairness to defendants as 
well as adequate deterrence.7 
Preceding the rise of white-collar criminal prosecution was the rise 
of the plea deal, a legal development that would begin as an 
extraordinary method of case resolution for obviously guilty defendants 
and would come to envelop upwards of ninety percent of criminal 
cases.8  Because this accepted practice has come to dominate the 
criminal justice landscape, it is important to have serious discussions 
about the protection of rights in that context.  Justice Kennedy in 
Missouri v. Frye remarked regarding plea bargaining: 
Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the 
guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any 
errors in the pretrial process. ‘To a large extent . . . horse 
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] 
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what 
plea bargaining is.  It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice 
system; it is the criminal justice system.’9 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis exhibits the need to ensure that the plea 
bargaining stage of criminal adjudication affords sufficient rights to 
criminal defendants.  This proposition remains just as true for white-
collar defendants.  
One area in which academic and circuit court interest has piqued is 
the Brady right to exculpatory evidence.  While traditionally serving as 
a due process trial right since its inception in 1963, many have argued 
for the expansion of Brady material rights into the plea bargaining 
context to ensure a fair criminal justice process for the ninety-four to 
ninety-seven percent of criminal defendants who plead guilty and never 
face the traditional bulwark of criminal justice—the jury trial.10 
Without minimizing the importance of this discussion’s outcome to 
the traditional criminal defendant, it seems that the expansion of Brady 
material to the plea bargaining stage can have special and distinct 
implications for a white-collar target or defendant.  This Comment will 
 
 7 J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, 
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 49 (2007). 
 8 Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining From the Ground Up: Accuracy and 
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1058–59 (2016). 
 9 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (alteration and emphasis in 
original). 
 10 See, e.g., James M. Grossman, Getting Brady Right: Why Extending Brady v. 
Maryland’s Trial Right to Plea Negotiations Better Protects a Defendant’s Constitutional 
Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 BYU. L. REV. 1525, 1535–36 (2016); Corrina Barrett 
Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2002). 
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argue that because of the inherent complexity of white-collar criminal 
prosecutions, as well as other factors, pressure is exerted on the 
defendant to enter into plea agreements.  Because of these pressures, 
including intricate and vague legal and factual issues, exorbitant costs, 
the need for cooperators, and high sentencing guidelines, it is all the 
more imperative that we ensure defendants are fully aware of the 
circumstances surrounding their plea to ensure a just outcome and a 
just legal system.  
While much academic interest has been devoted to the expansion 
of the Brady trial right to the context of plea bargaining, those arguing 
for that expansion are missing an important and compelling piece of 
their argument, which exists in the white-collar context.11  Academic 
work seems to either discredit the fact that white-collar crime may 
create unique justifications or ignores its distinct existence altogether.  
While not discrediting arguments for the expansion of Brady in general, 
and not claiming that white-collar defendants are more deserving of 
such protections, those who argue for Brady expansion would be ill-
advised to continue to dismiss compelling justifications that exist for 
white-collar defendants.  It is the purpose of this Comment to present 
those justifications.  
Part II of this Comment will discuss Brady v. Maryland and its 
progeny.  This Part will develop an understanding of what a criminal 
defendant is entitled to from a due process standpoint and the 
underlying reasoning behind the Brady line of cases.  This Part will also 
track the shift of Brady from its position as purely a trial right into the 
realm of plea deals, a practice that encompasses the large majority of 
criminal adjudications.  It will end with an analysis of the circuit split 
concerning whether the Brady right to exculpatory evidence extends to 
the context of plea bargaining. 
Part III of this Comment will discuss the rise of the plea deal as the 
workhorse of American criminal adjudication.  This Part will also 
discuss some of the potential reasons for that development.  
Part IV of this Comment will discuss distinct considerations that 
arise in the context of white-collar crime.  This Part will explain that 
white-collar crime is inherently complex, and stemming from that 
 
 11 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 1063 (mentioning white-collar defendants only to 
say that they “can afford great lawyers and thorough investigations” and, therefore, 
implying that the white-collar defendants concerns are minimized); Grossman, supra 
note 10, at 1535–36 (discussing DNA-based exonerations and wrongful convictions 
concerning death-row inmates obviating the need for expansion of Brady into the 
context of plea deals); Lain, supra note 10 (discussing expansion generally with no 
mention of white-collar crime); Petegorsky, infra note 29, at 3601 (arguing for the 
expansion of Brady material to plea bargaining through the lens of a robbery case). 
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complexity are a host of considerations that inform the white-collar 
space and create unique justifications for expanding the rights of white-
collar defendants.  Particularly, the complexity of these crimes leads to 
a “white-collar rationale” by which courts have been willing to erode 
some protections of white-collar defendants, particularly in the area of 
investigation, because of the difficulty of prosecuting such crimes.12  
Likewise, white-collar complexity leads to vague actus reus elements, 
confusing mens rea elements, and prohibitive costs, all of which exert 
pressure on the white-collar defendant to resolve litigation as quickly as 
possible.13  Lastly, the exorbitantly high Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
particularly for economic crimes, make any “choice” of whether or not 
to plead guilty dangerously close to coercion.14  The high guidelines, 
coupled with the practice of overcharging, exert even more pressure on 
the defendant to accept a better deal over risking the “trial penalty.”15  
Parallel issues certainly exist outside of the white-collar context, raising 
similar, if not worse, concerns.16  These issues are highlighted here in 
the context of white-collar crime, however, because while concerns have 
been extensively addressed in the context of traditional crime, or 
criminal law in general, white-collar crime has received comparatively 
less focus.  
Part V of this Comment will explain how these distinct 
considerations inform the need for Brady exculpatory evidence in the 
context of plea deals. 
II.  BRADY AND ITS PROGENY: FROM TRIAL TO PLEA DEALS 
In the seminal case, Brady v. Maryland, Brady and a companion, 
Boblit, faced trial for first-degree murder.17  Brady admitted to 
involvement in the crime but denied participating in the physical killing, 
implicating Boblit as the actual killer.18  Brady admitted guilt to first-
 
 12 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115–16 (1988). 
 13 Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal 
Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 867 (2009). 
 14 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 6 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/
getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-
amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf 
[hereinafter THE TRIAL PENALTY].  
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Danielle Snyder, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Look at the Disproportionate 
Effects of Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences on Racial Minorities and How They 
Have Contributed to the Degradation of the Underprivileged African-American Family, 36 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 77 (2015). 
 17 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). 
 18 Id. 
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degree murder and asked only that the jury not return the death 
penalty.19  Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict of capital 
punishment.20 
Before the trial, Brady’s attorney asked to examine statements 
made by Boblit.21  Several were examined, but the prosecution withheld 
a particular statement.22  In the withheld statement, Boblit admitted to 
the physical killing.23  Brady did not learn of the statement until after his 
trial, conviction, sentencing, and unsuccessful appeal.24  
The Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”25  This holding was not 
untrodden ground, but rather an expansion of a line of earlier cases that 
expressed the desire for our society to ensure a truly fair trial system.26  
The Court explained that society’s goal is not merely to ensure that the 
guilty are convicted but also to ensure that our nation has a justice 
system with an overarching principle of fairness.27  Justice Douglas, 
writing for a 7-2 majority, expressed this concern by stating, “our 
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly.”28  The Brady holding organically transformed from a 
constitutional due process right into a prosecutorial discovery 
obligation on the government to provide such evidence at the trial phase 
of a criminal adjudication.29 
Giglio v. United States expanded the Brady rule to impeachment 
evidence.30  The Supreme Court in Giglio held that where guilt or 
innocence turns on the reliability of a witness, nondisclosure of 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 87.  
 26 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that even when the state 
does not solicit the false evidence, if the prosecutor allows it to go uncorrected a 
violation of due process will result); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1935) 
(holding that the government’s knowing use of perjured testimony and suppression of 
evidence favorable to the defendant resulted is a violation of Constitutional rights).  
 27 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose 
Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3604 
(2013). 
 30 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
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impeachment evidence for that witness falls under the Brady rule and is 
a violation of due process.31  In other words, the due process 
requirement for Brady material at trial encompasses both exculpatory 
evidence and impeachment evidence under certain circumstances.  
The Court furthered the prosecutorial discovery obligation in 
United States v. Agurs, in which it held that material evidence of 
substantial value to the defendant must be turned over, even absent a 
specific request by the defense for such material.32  The Court based its 
conclusion on what it called “elementary fairness,” finding that while the 
prosecutor has a duty to earnestly prosecute the accused, the people’s 
overriding interest is in a just outcome.33  The prosecutor “is the ‘servant 
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer.’”34  This role requires the prosecutor to turn over 
Brady material even if the defendant does not ask for it, a departure 
from the adversarial practice of law in the name of justice.35 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bagley refined the standard 
for Brady material by finding that evidence is “material” for Brady 
purposes if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, the result of a proceeding may have been different.36  In other 
words, withholding evidence only violates due process when such 
evidence has a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.37  Kyles 
v. Whitley further refined the materiality standard by holding that the 
standard does not require that the defendant would have been acquitted 
had the evidence been disclosed, but the suppression must only 
“undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.”38 
Throughout the development of the Brady rule, the Court’s 
overarching concern remained the fairness of the judicial system.39  The 
impact on defendants and the fairness of trials remained the principal 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).  
 33 Id. at 110.  
 34 Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 35 Id. at 107. 
 36 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
 37 Id. 
 38 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  
 39 See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693 (White, J., concurring) (“With a minimum of effort, 
the state could improve the real and apparent fairness of the trial enormously, by 
assuring that the defendant may place before the trier of fact favorable evidence known 
to the government.”). 
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focus.40  These justifications have featured prominently in the 
arguments over the expansion of Brady to the plea deal context.41 
III.  THE RISE OF THE PLEA DEAL 
Plea bargains have come to encompass a massive proportion of 
criminal cases.  Between ninety-four and ninety-seven percent of 
criminal cases in the United States are resolved through a guilty plea.42  
At the federal level, their acceptance is enshrined in Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11, which states, “[a]n attorney for the government 
and the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, 
may discuss and reach a plea agreement.”43  Further, in an unrelated 
case also entitled Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
guilty plea was a constitutional mechanism for criminal justice 
adjudication.44  The Court reasoned: 
We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to 
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a 
substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his 
plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to 
enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords 
hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time 
than might otherwise be necessary. . . .  A contrary holding 
would require the States and Federal Government to forbid 
guilty pleas altogether . . . .  The Fifth Amendment does not 
reach so far.45 
The prevalence of plea bargaining has come to the point of nearly 
inescapable prominence; the practice is here to stay.46  More than ninety 
percent of the time, plea bargaining is the end of a criminal adjudication, 
making that stage the final opportunity to protect the defendant’s 
rights.47 
 
 40 See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Our overriding concern 
in cases such as the one before us is the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”). 
 41 Petegorsky, supra note 29, at 3613 (“General appeals to fairness motivate the 
desire for Brady disclosure during plea bargaining as well: if the true goal of the criminal 
process is justice, then a prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence to coerce a 
defendant to plead guilty directly contravenes that goal.”).  
 42 Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact 
of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014).  
 43 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 44 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).  
 45 Id. 
 46 But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 
1037 (1984) (arguing that the “pervasively important assumption” that plea bargaining 
is necessary and inevitable is mistaken).  
 47 Lain, supra note 10, at 49.  
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American plea bargaining began as a tool for prosecutors to 
dispose of cases and eventually gained traction with judges, creating a 
dynamic where “all of the system’s power-holders” shared an interest in 
plea bargaining.48  Professional prosecutors were rare in colonial 
America.49  As they became more commonplace, defense attorneys 
likewise became more common, the rules of evidence became more 
formalized, and trials went from lasting minutes to lasting days.50  These 
factors created a packed docket, convincing many judges to accept guilty 
pleas.51  By 1900, the rate of guilty pleas was close to ninety percent and 
the plea bargaining system had cemented its place in American criminal 
practice.52  As early as 1920, observers commented on the 
disappearance of the jury trial.53  Plea bargaining has now reached a 
point in the twenty-first century where some jurisdictions have few, if 
any, criminal trials.54  But because the plea bargain began as an 
exceptional process, a way for certainly guilty defendants to expedite 
their cases and save the hassle of reaching an obvious conclusion, the 
legal system did not attempt to include safeguards into the system.55  
This lack of safeguards in an adjudication mechanism with such 
prominence creates concern over a potential lack of justice in the 
American criminal justice system.56 
Professional prosecutors are not the only force credited with 
spurring the rise of the guilty plea.  Several factors contributed to the 
preeminence of plea bargaining, and the preeminence of plea bargaining 
 
 48 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1016 (2000); see also 
Bibas, supra note 8, at 1059. 
 49 Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sep. 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id.  
 53 Fisher, supra note 48, at 859. 
 54 Alkon, supra note 42, at 562.  
 55 Bibas, supra note 8, at 1059; see also THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14 (arguing 
that the jury trial was established as a means of protecting against the tyranny of 
government and ensuring that the protections of the Constitution were not trampled, 
but the rise of the guilty plea serves no similar purpose of transparency and 
accountability). 
 56 While this article will focus exclusively on the American criminal justice system, 
it is worth mentioning that the expansion of plea bargaining has become a global affair.  
See Robert Hanson, Plea Bargains Save Time and Money, But Are Too Easily Abused, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/09/plea-
bargains-save-time-and-money-but-are-too-easily-abused (showing that of ninety 
countries studied in 1990, only sixteen permitted plea bargaining, but by 2017, sixty-six 
of them did). 
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necessarily created the shirking of the jury trial.  Fisher’s take on this 
outcome is quite glum: 
There is no glory in plea bargaining.  In place of a noble clash 
for truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce.  Opposing 
lawyers shrink from battle, and the jury’s empty box signals 
the system’s disappointment.  But though its victory merits no 
fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed.  Bloodlessly and 
clandestinely, it has swept across the penal landscape and 
driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance.  
Plea bargaining may be, as some chroniclers claim, the 
invading barbarian.  But it has won all the same. . . .  Like most 
of history’s victors, plea bargaining won in great part because 
it served the interests of the powerful.57 
Aside from his mournful prose, Fisher’s analysis demonstrates that the 
guilty plea has overtaken the criminal justice system.  His analysis and 
implicit disapproval are not new, nor without concurrence.  The 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the 1877 case, Wight v. Rindskopf, stated 
that pleas are an encroachment on the role of the judiciary and “hardly, 
if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale of justice.”58  Still 
today, plea bargaining continues to be extensively criticized by 
academics, jurists, and advocates.59  But what caused such a dynamic is 
likely a web of factors.  
Some argue that the expansion of the criminal justice system 
spurred the rise of the guilty plea.60  “[T]he criminal-justice system has 
become a ‘capacious, onerous machinery that sweeps everyone in,’ and 
plea bargains, with their swift finality, are what keep that machinery 
running smoothly.”61  Because of the vast expansion of the criminal 
justice system, the only way to keep it functioning is to adjudicate a 
majority of cases through plea bargaining; the system simply could not 
operate without the guilty plea.62  This preeminence, and the harsh 
consequences that may come with conviction at trial, means that it may 
be a rational choice to plead guilty to a crime of which you are innocent, 
avoiding the jury trial altogether and eroding the quintessential 
defender of innocence.63  
 
 57 Fisher, supra note 48, at 859. 
 58 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877). 
 59 Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent On Plea Bargaining, 
ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/plea-
bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112. 
 60 Yoffe, supra note 49. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Gretchen Gavett, The Problem with Pleas, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 31, 2011), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-pleas. 
 63 Id. 
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Others argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines strongly 
contribute to the downfall of the jury trial.  According to the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the exorbitant sentences 
imposed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, particularly for 
economic crimes under Section 2B1.1, make any choice of whether to 
plead guilty or go to trial purely illusory, because the “trial penalty” of a 
jury conviction is too high to risk.64  In other words, a cost-benefit 
analysis supplants guilt or innocence as the determinant of whether or 
not many defendants will plead guilty.65  Likewise a function of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the practice of overcharging has been 
named as a reason for the acceptance of guilty pleas.66  The charging 
decisions of prosecutors are largely immune from any formal process of 
legal review.67  Through this process of filing additional charges or 
excess counts, the prosecutor creates leverage in plea negotiations and 
makes the eventual plea offer seem more attractive.68  Consequently, 
more plea deals are made, and fewer jury trials take place.  
It is worth noting that some recognize that plea bargaining is not 
inherently one-sided.  Both the prosecutor and the defendant generally 
have some bargaining power to exercise that will help their outcome.69  
The prosecutor is practically limited in his or her ability to bring cases 
to trial.  The basic constraints on time mean that only a fraction of cases 
can go to trial.70  Likewise, the burden of proof in criminal trials means 
that the prosecutor must grapple with the reality that he or she may not 
be able to present evidence sufficient to obtain a conviction.71  The 
prosecutor, however, can decide the charges, and decide the sentence 
recommendation to the judge, giving him immense power over the 
process.72  The prosecutor also may face administrative pressures to 
dispose of cases efficiently, meaning that if a defendant wishes to bring 
a case to trial, the prosecutor may have to decide whether or not that 
 
 64 See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14, at 343. 
 65 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk 
Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 84 (2009).  
 66 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
1303, 1304 (2018) (“As plea bargaining scholars have long recounted, prosecutors’ 
ability to threaten inflated sentences, combined with their power to trade those 
sentences away for pleas of guilt, allows them to control ‘who goes to prison and for how 
long.’”). 
 67 Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in Federal Punishment: Research and Policy 
Implications, 31 FED. SENT. R. 256, 258 (2019).  
 68 Id. 
 69 Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 93 (1976). 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 94. 
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trial will be effectual.73  As Justice White recognized in Brady v. United 
States, the criminal defendant can receive a substantial benefit from a 
guilty plea in exchange for giving a substantial benefit to the state.74  
Both sides typically have bargaining power, though problems with plea 
bargaining persist.  
Regardless of the underlying reason or coalition of reasons 
spurring the rise of guilty pleas, the American criminal justice system 
has accepted the practice as the workhorse of criminal adjudication, 
though its participants and supposed beneficiaries may mourn with 
Professor Fisher.  This dynamic creates a need in American criminal law 
to take rights that traditionally only existed in the case of the jury trial 
and find ways to ensure that the same issues are addressed in the 
context of plea bargaining so that the same unfairness may be avoided.  
A.  Brady in the Context of Plea Deals 
Despite the vast criticisms of the plea bargaining process and 
abundance of calls for reform,75 some circuit courts have balked at the 
opportunity to expand the rights of criminal defendants in this context.  
Circuit courts are split over whether or not the prosecutor’s duty to turn 
over Brady material applies in the context of plea deals or is confined to 
the realm of the jury trial.76  The Supreme Court fueled this debate in its 
2002 decision in United States v. Ruiz.77  In that case, the Supreme Court 
placed a major limitation on Brady rights, but only on the expansion of 
Brady that came out of Giglio.78  The Court held that a defendant’s due 
process rights were not violated when a prosecutor failed to disclose 
impeachment evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.79  This holding 
did not explicitly encompass the traditional Brady exculpatory 
evidence.80  As such, circuits post-Ruiz have created a split over whether 
due process is violated by a prosecutor’s failure to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.81  
The first appellate court to address that issue was the Seventh 
Circuit, and they reasoned in favor of expansion in McCann v. 
Mangialardi.82  While lacking the opportunity to actually decide the 
 
 73 Id. at 93–94. 
 74 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). 
 75 See Walsh, supra note 59. 
 76 Grossman, supra note 10, at 1529. 
 77 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
 78 Id. at 631. 
 79 Id. at 625.  
 80 Grossman, supra note 10, at 1529. 
 81 Id.  
 82 337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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issue of whether the right to Brady exculpatory evidence exists in the 
context of a plea deal, the Seventh Circuit found that the language used 
by the Supreme Court in Ruiz strongly suggested that if exculpatory 
evidence were withheld, a violation of due process would result.83  They 
based this finding on the Supreme Court’s distinction between 
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence, with the former being 
difficult to characterize as “critical information of which the defendant 
must always be aware prior to pleading guilty.”84 
The Tenth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Ohiri, largely 
agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in McCann.85  The court 
here again relied on the distinctions drawn in Ruiz between 
impeachment information and exculpatory evidence.86  Based on that 
separate treatment, the Seventh Circuit found that Ruiz was not 
intended to apply to exculpatory evidence, but only to impeachment 
information.  Because the evidence in Ohiri was exculpatory, the 
defendant could mount a Brady challenge.87 
Opposing the reasoning of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, other 
circuits have held that the Brady right to exculpatory evidence, like the 
right to impeachment evidence implicated in Ruiz, does not exist in the 
plea bargaining context.  In perhaps the strongest rejection of such an 
expansion, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Conroy flatly rejected the 
argument that the Supreme Court’s limitation to impeachment evidence 
in Ruiz implied that exculpatory evidence was on a different footing and 
could give rise to a Brady challenge to a guilty plea.88  The Fifth Circuit 
held that the entry of a guilty plea precluded the defendant from 
challenging on Brady grounds.89 
In Friedman v. Rehal, the Second Circuit took up the issue and also 
found that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ruiz would apply to both 
impeachment and exculpatory evidence.90  The Second Circuit explained 
that the Supreme Court “has consistently treated exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the 
obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady material prior to trial.”91  
Because of this undifferentiated treatment, the court found that the 
 
 83 Id. at 787–88. 
 84 Id. at 787. 
 85 133 Fed. Appx. 555 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 86 Id. at 562. 
 87 Id. 
 88 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 89 Id. 
 90 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
 91 Id. 
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holding in Ruiz would likely apply to exculpatory evidence as well.92  
Nonetheless, the court did not have the opportunity to reach the 
question because the evidence at issue in Friedman, which involved the 
fact that one witness was hypnotized to help him recall information, fit 
squarely within the category of impeachment evidence.93   
The Fourth Circuit, much like the Second, did not have the 
opportunity to reach the Brady issue.94  The court did, however, strongly 
indicate that they would agree with the Fifth Circuit that the right to 
Brady material did not exist in the context of a guilty plea.  The court cast 
the Brady right as purely a trial right.95  The purpose of the right, 
according to the court, was to “preserve the fairness of a trial verdict and 
to minimize the chance that an innocent person would be found 
guilty.”96  The court noted that when a defendant pleads guilty, the 
concerns of an innocent conviction are “almost completely eliminated 
because his guilt is admitted.”97  This dicta strongly indicates that the 
Fourth Circuit would hold that the Brady right does not attach to the 
entry of a guilty plea. 
In light of this circuit split, and the overwhelming proportion of 
criminal adjudications taking place via plea bargain, rather than through 
a trial, expansion of traditional trial rights, like Brady, outside of the trial 
context is increasingly important.98  Such an expansion would not be 
without precedent, as the Supreme Court has, as recently as 2012,  
expanded other traditional “trial rights” to the context of plea 
bargaining.99  As the remainder of this Comment will show, such an 
expansion is uniquely important in the white-collar context, and such 
arguments should not be ignored by those who favor the expansion of 
Brady. 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 153. 
 94 United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010).  
 95 Id. at 285.  
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.  
 98 See Grossman, supra note 10, at 1536 (arguing that the Brady rule is useless to 
most defendants because “an overwhelming number of cases never reach trial.  Thus, 
Brady cannot help the supermajority of defendants” who plead guilty). 
 99 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 
(2012) (expanding the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to the 
plea bargaining context). 
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IV.  DISTINCT CONSIDERATIONS IN WHITE-COLLAR CASES 
In order to analyze the implications of plea deal Brady material in 
the context of white-collar crime, it is first important to engage in a 
surface level discussion about the definition of white-collar crime.  
Edwin Sutherland is credited with coining the term “white collar crime” 
in a speech to the American Sociological Society in 1939.100  He later 
defined the term to mean “a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”101  
Sutherland, however, operated in the field of Sociology, and thus did not 
seek to create a legal definition of use to this current analysis.102  His 
focus was entirely theoretical; he hoped to create a better 
understanding of criminal behavior.103 
Herbert Edelhertz attempted to remedy this deficiency and helped 
guide the term’s shift into the legal space by defining white-collar crime 
as “an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means 
and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the 
payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal 
advantage.”104  Because Edelhertz was the former head of the Fraud 
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, this definition was influential 
in how the Justice Department would come to define white-collar crime 
in the 1970s.105  Particularly distinct in Edelhertz’s definition is the 
removal of the personal element, which Sutherland employed.  In other 
words, Edelhertz identified only the offense, without characterizing the 
offender.  
The FBI’s White-Collar Crime subsection of its website states that 
such crimes are “characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of 
trust and are not dependent on the application or threat of physical 
force or violence.  The motivation behind these crimes is financial—to 
obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to secure a 
personal or business advantage.”106  The FBI website goes on to 
establish several criminal acts that lend themselves to the white-collar 
 
 100 POVEDA, supra note 3, at 31. 
 101 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983).  
 102 James William Coleman, The Theory of White-Collar Crime From Sutherland to the 
1990s in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 53 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 
1992). 
 103 Id.  
 104 HERBERT EDELHERTZ, NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, THE NATURE, 
IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970).  
 105 POVEDA, supra note 3, at 40.  
 106 FBI, White Collar Crime, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime 
(last visited October 28, 2019). 
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context, including “public corruption, money laundering, corporate 
fraud, securities and commodities fraud, mortgage fraud, financial 
institution fraud, bank fraud and embezzlement, fraud against the 
government, election law violations, mass marketing fraud, and health 
care fraud.”107 
Some choose to define white-collar crime by reference to what it is 
not.  One such formulation by a law professor states: 
A white collar offense is one that does not necessarily involve 
the use or threat of physical force, either against the victim or 
the victim’s property. Nor does “white collar crime” 
encompass offenses directly related to the possession, sale, or 
distribution of controlled substances. The term “white collar 
crime” also excludes crime directly related to organized crime 
activities. Finally, “white collar crime” excludes laws relating 
to certain policy-driven areas such as immigration, civil rights, 
and national security, and excludes common theft crimes. This 
definition of white collar crime is a broad one, encompassing 
offenses from simple fraud using the mail and wires to local 
political corruption cases and sophisticated securities and tax 
cases.108 
This formulation creates another definition focusing on the crime itself 
to the exclusion of any consideration of the offender. 
One dictionary definition reads “crime that typically involves 
stealing money from a company and that is done by people who have 
important positions in the company: crime committed by white-collar 
workers.”109  This definition, while arguably not far from Sutherland’s 
original definition, certainly does not create a useful benchmark for 
analysis.  Merriam-Webster likewise has a legal definition of “white-
collar crime,” which reads, “crime that is committed by salaried 
professional workers or persons in business and that usually involves a 
form of financial theft or fraud (as in securities dealing).”110  This 
definition is also both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
There is no widely accepted definition of white-collar crime.111  
Definitions focusing on the offender can potentially lend themselves to 
bias and prejudice.  Those focusing only on the offense will be both over 
 
 107 Id.  
 108 Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 
1209–10 (1999).  
 109 White-Collar Crime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/white-collar%20crime (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Gerald Cliff & Christian Desilets, White Collar Crime: What It Is and Where It’s 
Going, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS PUB. POL’Y 481, 482 (2014). 
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and under-inclusive.  It is beyond the purpose of this Comment to 
develop a comprehensive and usable definition of white-collar crime.  
Suffice it to say that it is important for the reader to have a common 
sense understanding of what is typically considered to be white-collar 
crime, and what, for lack of a better term, this Comment will refer to as 
traditional crime (non-white-collar crime). 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have never treated 
defendants’ Brady rights differently based upon the type of crime 
committed, be it a traditional crime or a white-collar crime.  Traditional 
crime defendants and white-collar defendants, in theory, possess the 
same rights, adjusting for the circuit in which they are charged.  But 
while the need for exculpatory evidence may seem obvious in the 
traditional crime context, such a need in white-collar crime is not as 
intuitive.112  For traditional criminal defendants, Brady material may 
consist of a confirmed alibi,113 another person’s confession,114 a blood 
sample that does not match the defendant,115 or a whole host of other 
items that may lead to a moment of courtroom drama.  A white-collar 
defendant’s Brady material may not be as strikingly obvious and, hence, 
has attracted less academic interest.116  Nonetheless, the need for 
Brady’s expansion in the plea deal context of a white-collar prosecution 
is just as necessary for the preservation of a fair criminal justice system 
and presents unique considerations that justify such expansion.  These 
justifications present an important and compelling piece of the 
argument that such expansion must take place, and those who argue in 
favor of such an expansion would be mistaken to continue ignoring it.  
The white-collar defendant is faced with systematic differences 
that arise out of the nature of the crime involved.  The Supreme Court in 
Braswell v. United States found that prosecution of white-collar crime is 
inherently difficult.117  Because of this inherent difficulty, the Court 
noted their apprehension about affording broader rights to white-collar 
targets during the investigation stage.118  This “White Collar Rationale” 
favors the government at the expense of white-collar targets and 
 
 112 Some have also stated that people simply do not care about fairness for white-
collar defendants.  Walter Pavlo, Can White-Collar Defendant’s Get a Fair Trial?, FORBES 
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2012/12/19/can-white-
collar-defendants-get-a-fair-trial/#11cdfb58590a. 
 113 Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 114 Michael Hanline, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://californiainnocenceproject.org/
read-their-stories/michael-hanline (last visited October 30, 2019). 
 115 People v. Murphy, 128 A.D.2d 177, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
 116 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 117 Henning, supra note 1, at 410.  
 118 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115–16 (1988).  
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defendants by avoiding proscriptions on government power that will 
allow the already difficult task of prosecuting white-collar crime to 
become even harder.119  The same complexity recognized by the Court 
in Braswell ultimately pervades the white-collar space to the extent that 
it creates unique justifications for the expansion of Brady rights.  While 
being useful to the prosecutor from a practical perspective, it serves as 
a justification for those advocating for the expansion of Brady rights to 
the plea bargaining stage.  
The complexity of white-collar prosecution creates an independent 
factor that lends itself to the proposition that Brady rights are 
particularly necessary in the white-collar space.  White-collar criminal 
prosecution involves intricate factual and legal issues, a dynamic that 
has particular importance for the Brady analysis.  White-collar crime is 
inherently more complex than traditional crime, and evidence of 
wrongdoing is often concealed in mountains of discovery.120  
Additionally, the issues involved in white-collar crime are significantly 
different from those involved in the context of traditional crime.121  
In a white-collar case, it may be less clear whether the defendant 
committed a crime.122 This uncertainty grants the prosecutor greater 
discretion on whether to charge and what to charge, increasing the 
prosecutor’s bargaining power over white-collar targets.123  This 
increased bargaining power can manifest itself as pressure on the 
white-collar defendant to plead guilty.124  Samuel Buell identified two 
ways in which the criminal justice system responded to the difficulties 
of white-collar prosecution, both of which create concerns for targets.125  
First, he argues that white-collar statutes are open-ended, refusing to 
define criminal behavior with any specificity so as to remain flexible for 
“innovative wrongdoing.”126  Others have referred to this concept as an 
“over-criminalization” that is the “product of vague, duplicative, and 
sometimes incomprehensible criminal statutes that aggressive 
 
 119 Henning, supra note 1, at 410.  
 120 Id. at 408.  
 121 Ribstein, supra note 13; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an 
Adversarial System: Lessons From Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165 (2004) (recognizing that other commentators have discussed 
the immense power of federal prosecutors and the current status of white-collar 
criminal prosecutions allows federal prosecutors to act as gods).  
 122 Ribstein, supra note 13.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1628 
(2007). 
 126 Id.  
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prosecutors apply to an ever-widening array of circumstances.”127  This 
furthers the dynamic of prosecutorial discretion that leads to increased 
bargaining power and pressure on white-collar targets and defendants 
to plead guilty.  Secondly, white-collar prosecution places a strong 
emphasis on mental state, in part because of the ambiguous actus reus 
elements.128  Because white-collar statutes contain uncertain actus reus 
elements that are malleable to innovation, the concern will largely focus 
on the mens rea of the individual involved.  
White-collar defendants themselves may not even know whether 
or not they have broken the law.129  Particularly in the corporate context, 
mens rea can be even more challenging because decision-making may 
be more diffuse.130  In the traditional crime context, the defendant often 
has the best sense of whether or not he or she is guilty, which, despite 
inadequacies in the criminal justice system disadvantaging defendants 
which are beyond the scope of this Comment, can serve as a safeguard 
to the entry of an innocent guilty plea.131  For the white-collar defendant, 
the uncertainty and fear of what a jury may infer about his or her mental 
state can be a daunting gamble that he or she is simply unwilling to make 
when a guilty plea will come with less jarring punitive consequences.   
Because of this emphasis on mens rea, which is more central to a 
white-collar prosecution, the defendant has more uncertainty, and thus, 
some might be more likely to adopt a cost-benefit analysis, rather than 
a guilt-innocence analysis.132  A prosecution turning on mens rea “can 
be more difficult to anticipate, harder to defend against, and more likely 
to produce error by the fact finder.”133  While the white-collar target or 
defendant will, of course, know the mental state he possessed during the 
event or series of events in question, he will likely be unaware of how 
that mental state comports with the law and whether or not the actual 
acts he took were criminal in nature.134  He is even less informed of what 
the fact-finder will infer about his or her mental state.  The white-collar 
 
 127 Strader, supra note 7. 
 128 Buell, supra note 125.  
 129 Ribstein, supra note 13, at 865. 
 130 Id. at 866. 
 131 But see Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1065, 1114 (2015).  
 132 See Podgor, supra note 65.  
 133 Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 841 
(2014). 
 134 See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 869 (noting that while traditional crime may have 
mens rea requirements of “knowledge” or “purpose” that are straightforward and well-
defined, white-collar crime may be accompanied by mens rea requirements such as 
“willfulness,” “bad purpose,” or “consciousness of wrongdoing” which creates more 
difficult issues). 
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defendant may not even have the bare protection of being convinced of 
his or her guilt or innocence, opening the door for innocent guilty pleas 
through a mechanism not present in the traditional criminal context.  
The standards used in white-collar crime are also newer and less 
settled than those in the traditional criminal context.  They do not come 
with extensive case law and can leave a legitimate question over 
whether a given course of conduct is legal or criminally punishable.135  
Subtle differences create the line between standard business practice 
and crime,136 and when wrongdoing does exist, it is often surrounded by 
a host of lawful and productive activities.137  As a whole, the substantive 
law underlying white-collar prosecutions is less favorable to defendants 
than it is in traditional crime.138 
The costs of white-collar criminal defense are also prohibitively 
high, yet again due to the complexity of the issues involved in such 
prosecutions.139  The white-collar defendant cannot mount a sufficient 
defense without digging into the complex legal and factual issues that 
have been discussed.  To effectively grapple with these issues, the white-
collar defense attorney must undertake extensive discovery, 
investigation, and fact-finding.  The defense attorney must also comb 
through massive amounts of discovery produced by the government 
that is likely the result of an extensive investigation undertaken by 
multiple federal agencies.  All of this translates to costing an inordinate 
amount of an attorney’s time, which translates to costing an inordinate 
amount of money for the defendant.140  By criminalizing behavior that is 
ambiguous, complex, and unclear, white-collar statutes ensure that 
defense of such claims is difficult, thereby ensuring that it is expensive, 
thereby ensuring that pressure is exerted on the white-collar defendant 
to avoid as much expense as possible, which will often mean a guilty 
plea.  Furthermore, prosecutorial resources in white-collar cases, and 
more narrowly in financial fraud cases, are more plentiful, meaning that 
the white-collar defendant must attempt to compete.141  
While sympathy for costs is typically not considered a significant 
concern for the white-collar criminal defendant, it certainly informs the 
discussion over why it is important to protect defendants’ rights.  
Because white-collar defendants are faced with criminal prosecutions 
 
 135 See id. at 863–64.  
 136 See id.  
 137 Buell, supra note 125, at 1627.  
 138 Buell, supra note 133, at 888. 
 139 See Buell, supra note 125, at 1650. 
 140 Ribstein, supra note 13, at 866. 
 141 See Strader, supra note 7, at 53.  
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that are inherently more expensive to defend, the argument that such 
defendants have more money, and that we are therefore less concerned 
about their adequate representation, is futile.  Most white-collar 
defendants cannot afford a proper defense because of the higher costs 
involved in defending white-collar crimes.142  The aspect of civil 
forfeiture that accompanies the white-collar context may also mean that 
criminal defendants are unable to pay their counsel of choice because 
their funds are seized by the government as potential proceeds of the 
illegal act.143  This high economic cost is not presented to show that the 
white-collar defendant is worse off than the traditional criminal 
defendant, but rather to show that it is a mistake to dismiss the 
protection of white-collar defendants simply because of a 
misconception that such persons have the economic resources to 
adequately defend themselves.  White-collar defendants are likely to be 
richer than traditional criminal defendants,144 but relying on those 
resources as a justification for ignoring conversation regarding white-
collar reform is a mistaken premise given the greater resources needed 
for an adequate defense.  Similarly, if one subscribes to one of the 
offense-based definitions of white-collar crime, such a discussion would 
be futile because white-collar crime under those definitions can cross 
socioeconomic boundaries. 
Lastly, sentencing guidelines treat the white-collar defendant with 
“genuine harshness.”145  Historically, this was not the case.  White-collar 
offenders were privileged in their sentencing, and “[p]robation, 
community service, fines, and short terms of imprisonment followed by 
early parole were commonplace.”146  In fact, the issues surrounding 
white-collar sentencing were among the chief reasons Congress decided 
to endorse the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which today control all 
federal sentencing.147 
The original guidelines made some movement away from leniency 
and parole and toward imprisonment for white-collar offenders.148  This 
was largely a measure meant to combat the disparity between 
traditional crime and white-collar crime sentences, which was 
unjustifiable for a system claiming blind justice and equality of 
 
 142 See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 860. 
 143 Lawrence S. Goldman & Jill R. Shellow-Levine, Pre-Indictment Representation in 
White-Collar Cases, 24 CHAMPION 18, 19 (2000).  
 144 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 29 (1997).  
 145 Buell, supra note 133, at 829.  
 146 Id. at 833.  
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 834. 
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punishment.149  Amendments in the following decades, however, turned 
a corrective measure into an about-face, making the sentencing of 
white-collar criminal defendants increasingly harsh.150 
Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 and was 
meant to address corporate crime while also changing the sentencing 
framework for white-collar crime.151  The changes affected harsher 
sentences for white-collar defendants by including sentencing 
enhancements for white-collar offenses that “affect a large number of 
victims or endanger the solvency or financial security of publicly traded 
corporations, other large employers, or 100 individual victims.”152  The 
act also sought to ensure that white-collar offenders would serve time 
in federal prisons, rather than half-way houses.153  
In Missouri v. Frye, a case dealing with the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that sentences that may be longer than appropriate appear 
on the books mainly because such disconcerting sentences can serve as 
a tool for the prosecutor to bargain with, rather than as a judgment by 
Congress or the prosecutor that such a sentence is deserved.154  The 
combination of prohibitive costs and unnerving sentences amounts to a 
form of coercion in which defendants have no financial ability to 
effectively defend themselves and win in the face of a massive sentence, 
so they must accept the lesser sentence offered in a plea bargain.155  
While this Comment is not making a judgment regarding the justice of 
American criminal sentencing in either the traditional or white-collar 
context, the reality of this exposure does inform the conversation.  
V.  BRADY, PLEAS, AND THE WHITE-COLLAR CONTEXT 
The complexity embedded within the prosecution and defense of 
white-collar crime creates pressures on the defendant to enter into 
guilty pleas.  The actus reus elements are broad.  The mens rea elements 
are more complex, less defined, and more relied upon, meaning that the 
prosecutor will have a harder time proving them, and the defendant will 
have more fear that they will be misconstrued.  The defendant himself 
 
 149 Id. at 833–34. 
 150 Id. at 834. 
 151 See Jamie L. Gustafson, Cracking Down on White Collar Crime: An Analysis of the 
Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 692 
(2007).  
 152 Id. at 693. 
 153 Id.  
 154 See 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).  
 155 Ribstein, supra note 13, at 860.  
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may not even know if his or her actions are criminally punishable.  These 
considerations create a distinct need for Brady material at the plea 
bargaining stage of white-collar prosecution.  Vague actus reus grants 
the prosecutor enormous amounts of discretion that can be exercised in 
charging decisions by allowing for “gray-area” prosecutions, which 
prosecute “behavior that does not plainly fall within the scope of the 
criminal statute.”156  Where wide discretion exists, so too should 
protections to counteract that discretion.  The expansion of Brady 
material to the plea bargaining stage would create an added protective 
mechanism that would help to counteract the pressures placed on 
defendants to plead guilty.  In the white-collar space, where wide 
discretion for prosecutors and unique pressures on defendants exists, 
this expansion is just as necessary as it is for the traditional criminal 
case.  Given the argument that substantive white-collar criminal law is 
less favorable to defendants than traditional criminal law,157 this may, 
in fact, be one area where it is possible to argue that it is even more 
imperative to the white-collar defendant that a Brady expansion takes 
place.  
It is important to note that the analysis of white-collar crime does 
not come at the expense of similar arguments for traditional crime, or 
criminal law in general.  This discussion is meant to highlight a piece of 
the rights-expansion argument that has been excluded in academic 
focus.  The distinct implications for white-collar defendants should not 
be equated with an argument that these considerations are superior or 
more imperative; they are simply co-existent and parallel.  For this 
reason, the expansion of Brady into the plea bargaining stage would 
serve as an important safeguard on the rights of white-collar 
defendants, just as it would for traditional criminal defendants.  
Ignoring this importance in favor of a focus on traditional crime 
disregards compelling justifications that exist in favor of the expansion 
of Brady rights.  
The turning over of exculpatory evidence would give the white-
collar defendant a more accurate picture of the outcome of a potential 
trial.  The issues in white-collar crime are complex and mens rea 
focused.  Access to exculpatory evidence will give the white-collar 
defendant a more accurate outlook on his or her defense, and whether 
or not there is a significant chance that his or her mens rea will be 
inferred to be criminally culpable.  
 
 156 Strader, supra note 7, at 49. 
 157 Buell, supra note 133, at 888.  
DERNBACH (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:22 PM 
2020] COMMENT 513 
Turning over exculpatory evidence would also not interfere with 
the “White Collar Rationale” espoused by the Court.  The White-Collar 
Rationale deals with the investigation of white-collar crime.  In other 
words, it is a recognition by the Court that placing obstacles in the way 
of government investigation will create more ways for defendants to 
shield their wrongdoing.  This important goal would not be impacted by 
the expansion of Brady.  Brady gives defendants access to government 
evidence when it is material and exculpatory.  This would in no way 
impede the government’s investigation of the crime.  By necessity, the 
investigation has already happened, and the government simply must 
share in the fruits to ensure that justice is done. 
The exorbitant costs of defending against a white-collar 
prosecution mean that many defendants will have no option but to plead 
guilty.  While we typically consider white-collar defendants to be 
wealthier, the costs involved in defending a long and complex white-
collar trial are extremely high, making it impossible for the average 
individual to defend.  This dynamic means that the white-collar 
defendant is pressured to plead guilty.  If the Brady right applied to such 
a guilty plea, there would be less concern that an innocent individual 
would plead guilty simply by virtue of costs.  Provided with exculpatory 
evidence, the white-collar defendant may be able to equalize his or her 
knowledge with that of the traditional criminal defendant, whose 
conscience stands as a barricade to an innocent plea.  The white-collar 
defendant will often not have the sense of reassurance that his or her 
factual innocence will prevail, because he or she may not know that such 
factual innocence exists.  With exculpatory evidence, the defendant can 
better assess the government’s case, which means they can better assess 
their guilty plea, resulting in a more favorable plea, a willingness to go 
to trial, or the prosecutor dropping charges that cannot be proved.  The 
alternative is an under-informed guilty plea driven by fear of costs and 
harsh sentencing without knowledge of evidence that would tend to 
show innocence.  Such a dynamic cannot be sustained in a justice system 
that is built around the premise of a search for truth.   
Exculpatory evidence will also help to lessen the fear imposed on 
white-collar defendants by high federal sentencing guidelines.  Harsher 
sentencing guidelines that came in response to what was perceived to 
be unfair leniency to the corporate and white-collar defendant mean 
that the possibility for a frightening outcome at trial informs the 
defendant’s willingness to plea bargain, exerting pressure on the 
defendant and acting as a tool for the prosecutor.  In fact, Section 2B1.1 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which deals with economic crimes, 
has been particularly criticized for yielding sentences that are 
DERNBACH (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:22 PM 
514 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:491 
disproportionate to the culpability of the defendant.158  This section of 
the guidelines allows for large sentencing enhancements based on the 
amount of loss that occurred or was intended to occur, meaning that a 
sentence can be drastically extended based on such monetary results.159  
For instance, in a securities fraud case, United States v. Adelson, US 
District Court Judge Rakoff recognized that the guidelines would call for 
life-imprisonment and stated that such a result showed that the 
“guidelines have run so amok that they are patently absurd on their 
face.”160  Because of these high sentences, white-collar defendants who 
fall under this section, and other white-collar sections as well, face 
unnerving pressure to plead guilty.  This places extraordinary power in 
the hands of prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas.  This is exhibited 
through the thorough documentation of the practice of overcharging as 
a tool for plea negotiations.161  Through access to exculpatory evidence, 
the white-collar defendant will have a better sense of what charges have 
the possibility of sticking, and which do not.  He or she will know that 
certain charges are impossible to pursue and have information relating 
to punishment.  If evidence exists that would reduce the level of 
punishment imposed on a defendant, that will help to better inform the 
guilty plea.  
It is important to note, however, that the white-collar defendant 
will frequently proffer—i.e., give the government evidence of his or her 
culpability—before the guilty plea.162  Because such proffers often occur 
pre-indictment, especially in the white-collar context where 
prosecutors are more willing to discuss the case pre-indictment,163 
many white-collar defendants will have admitted culpability before any 
Brady material would necessarily reach them even if the expansion of 
Brady to plea bargaining were to be achieved.  Although outside the 
scope of this Comment, this may present an argument for an even 
greater extension of the Brady right into the realm of pre-indictment 
proffer agreements.  The practice of proffering in white-collar crime 
shows that Brady expansion to plea bargains would not solve all fairness 
 
 158 See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14, at 343.  
 159 See id. 
 160 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 161 See generally Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye, Lafler, and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 478–80 (2014). 
 162 See Benjamin Naftalis, “Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper Scope of 
Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 13 
(2013) (“The pressure to cooperate with the government is particularly strong white-
collar cases . . . .”). 
 163 Goldman & Shellow-Lavine, supra note 143, at 71. 
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issues for white-collar defendants but would nonetheless be an 
important step in the right direction.  
Lastly, the availability of exculpatory evidence will also help to 
assure that guilty pleas are entered into based upon actual guilt.  The 
aim of the prosecutor is that “guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer.”164  The expansion of Brady into the plea bargaining context 
would have the effect of ensuring that the combined pressures 
discussed in this article do not amount to a coercive dynamic where the 
innocent white-collar defendant feels the need to plead guilty to escape 
the mere possibility of a stiffer sentence after trial.  While the possibility 
of an innocent defendant pleading guilty is mentioned last in this article, 
it is merely because such a possibility is a byproduct of the factors 
discussed earlier.  The discussion over substantive and procedural 
rights in the criminal space should always express concern over finding 
guilt and revealing innocence, and this Comment is so concerned.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The need for the expansion of Brady material into the plea 
bargaining context is paramount.  Plea bargains constitute the vast 
majority of criminal adjudications, and protections built to protect the 
rights of defendants during trial cannot be blind to the fact that the jury 
trial has receded to the background.  To protect constitutional rights, 
Brady rights must be transplanted into the plea bargaining context.  The 
white-collar crime arena has distinct considerations informing this 
debate, and counseling in favor of the expansion, which should not be 
ignored by those wishing to create that expansion.  White-collar crime 
criminalizes broad actus reus, thereby relying on mens rea and creating 
a body of substantive law that may be even less favorable to defendants 
than traditional criminal law.  The intricate legal issues involved will 
create an inordinately expensive defense.  High sentencing guidelines 
set the backdrop for this array of factors exerting pressure on a white-
collar defendant and prosecutor.  This combination of pressures, unique 
to the white-collar space, makes a white-collar defendant likely to plead 
guilty, even though innocent.  Expanding the Brady right to plea 
bargaining would give the white-collar defendant a better 
understanding of his or her defense and a better outlook on the realistic 
opportunity for success at trial, diminishing the likelihood of a guilty 
plea when, in fact, the defendant is innocent.  Those wishing to make this 
 
 164 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (quoting Berger v. United States, 
296 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
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system more just should use the white-collar context as an important 
piece of their argument to expand Brady to plea bargaining.  
 
